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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 44505
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) BONNEVILLE COUNTY NO. CR 2013-17847
v. )
)
CHRISTOPHER LEE SCHMID, ) APPELLANT'S BRIEF
)
Defendant-Appellant. )
___________________________)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Christopher Schmid contends the district court abused its discretion when it
revoked his probation and executed his underlying sentence in this case.  He asserts
that a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors in the record reveals that
continuing the period of probation would better serve the goals of sentencing.  As such,
this Court should vacate the order revoking probation and remand this case for an order
placing Mr. Schmid back on probation.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Schmid was charged with battery on a law enforcement officer in this case.
(R., p.39.)  This constituted Mr. Schmid’s first felony charge.  (Presentence Investigation
2Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.24-29, 42.)1  At that time, he was struggling with anxiety
issues, and when the officer approached him and ultimately grabbed him from behind,
Mr. Schmid reacted by punching the officer.  (R., p.21 (police report of the incident);
PSI, pp.23-24 (Mr. Schmid’s version of events).)  Defense counsel requested the district
court order a competency evaluation.  (R., pp.59-60.)  Based on that evaluation, the
district court granted defense counsel’s ensuing motion for commitment.  (R., pp.68,
76.)  During that time, Mr. Schmid was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder and a
panic disorder with agoraphobia, as well as alcohol and cannabis dependence.
(PSI, p.95.)
When proceedings resumed, Mr. Schmid pled guilty to the original charge, and
the State agreed to recommend the district court suspend his sentence and order his
participation in the mental health court program.  (R., pp.90, 93-96.)  The district court
accepted that recommendation, imposing an underlying unified sentence of five years,
with two years fixed.  (R., pp.112-17.)
However, Mr. Schmid struggled in the mental health court program and was
ultimately suspended for not complying with the treatment program.  (See R., p.146.)
Accordingly, the State filed allegations of probation violations.  (R., pp.139-40 (alleging
Mr. Schmid had absconded supervision); R., pp.146-47 (alleging he failed to participate
in, and successfully complete, the mental health court program).)  Defense counsel
moved for another psychiatric evaluation, which again concluded Mr. Schmid was not
1 The exhibits attached to the record in this case are provided in three independently
paginated electronic documents.  To avoid confusion, “PSI” will refer to the document
entitled “APSI and PSI.pdf,” “Letters” will refer to the document entitled “Letter to Judge
Shindurling From Corizon Health.pdf,” and “Tracking Logs” will refer to the document
entitled “Specialty Court Tracking Logs.pdf.”
3competent to proceed.  (R., pp.150-54; PSI, p.4.)  Accordingly, the district court ordered
he be committed again.  (R., pp.158-59.)
As Mr. Schmid underwent treatment for his symptoms, he was also able to
reestablish contact with his son for the first time in three years.  (PSI, p.88.)  One of the
state hospital clinicians explained that continued interaction would be good for both
Mr. Schmid and his son.  (PSI, p.88.)  The clinician also explained, “[I]t is our concern
that a return to jail might jeopardize [Mr. Schmid’s] improvement.”  (PSI, p.88.)
Once proceedings resumed, Mr. Schmid admitted the alleged probation
violations.  (R., p.187.)  However, his ensuing application for access to the problem
solving courts was denied.  (Tracking Logs, pp.2-3.)  As a result, the district court
revoked Mr. Schmid’s probation and retained jurisdiction.  (PSI, pp.192-95.)  Mr. Schmid
was placed in the traditional rider program.  (R., pp.199-200.)
Unfortunately, the state hospital clinician’s concerns proved prophetic.  (See PSI,
p.88.)  While in custody, Mr. Schmid struggled with taking his medications, and his
symptoms prevented him from participating in the rider program for a significant period
of the term of retained jurisdiction.  (See, e.g., Letters, pp.3-5.)  After holding a status
conference, the district court authorized a medical override to ensure Mr. Schmid was
receiving appropriate medication.  (R., pp.210, 213.)  Once Mr. Schmid was stabilized
on those medications, he became compliant and was returned to the rider program.
(PSI, p.18; Letters, p.1.)  He was then able to participate in some meaningful
programming, and the rider staff ultimately recommended he be returned to probation.
(See PSI, pp.6-7.)
4At a rider review hearing, the district court commended Mr. Schmid for the
progress he had made once the medication issue was resolved.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.10,
L.22 - p.11, L.1.)2  As a result, it decided to suspend Mr. Schmid’s sentence for a period
of approximately three years.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.8, L.25 - p.9, L.20.)  It also ordered him to
return to the mental health court program because it felt Mr. Schmid would benefit from
working with the ACT team within that program.  (Tr., Vol.1, p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.3.)
For all that, the mental health court program refused to take Mr. Schmid back.
(See Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.17-20.)  He was, however, accepted into the Wood Court
program.  (Tracking Logs, p.4.)  Unfortunately, not long after starting that program,
Mr. Schmid began experience anxiety attacks related to the requirements of that
program.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.14-18.)  Given that situation, he concluded that it would not
be healthy or productive for him to continue in that program, and so, he voluntarily
withdrew from Wood Court.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.6, Ls.19-23.)  However, he indicated he was
still willing to work through other forms of treatment while on probation.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.7,
Ls.21-25.)  Mr. Schmid also told the Court that he was continuing to become more
involved in both his children’s lives.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, Ls.18-22.)  Defense counsel
added that Mr. Schmid had been working to line up a job and housing so he could
continue to be productive on release.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.1-7.)  As such, defense
counsel argued that continuing Mr. Schmid’s probation with an alternative treatment
program, as that would allow him to continue building on the progress he had begun
2 The transcripts in this case are provided in two independently bound and paginated
volumes.  To avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing, inter alia, the
transcripts of the June 8, 2016, status conference/rider review hearing, and “Vol.2” will
refer to the volume containing the transcript of the joint admit/deny and disposition
hearing held on August 3, 2016.
5making in the rider program while also taking his anxiety issues into account.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.8, L.21 - p.9, L.9.)
The district court expressed its disappointment that Mr. Schmid was withdrawing
so soon after starting the Wood Court program, particularly given the efforts to get him
into that program.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.11, L.16 - p.12, L.9.)  It concluded that continuing
probation without some sort of structured program was inappropriate, and so, it revoked
Mr. Schmid’s probation and executed his underlying sentence.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.12,
L.10 - p.13, L.7.)  Mr. Schmid filed a notice of appeal timely from the order revoking his
probation and executing his underlying sentence.  (R., pp.248-49, 260-62.)
ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Schmid’s probation
and executed his underlying sentence.
ARGUMENT
The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court’s discretion.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).  A district court abuses its
discretion when it fails to recognize the issue as one of discretion, acts beyond the outer
limits of that discretion, or does not reach a decision based on an exercise of reason.
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601 (1989).  When deciding whether or not to revoke
probation, the district court must determine “whether the probation is achieving the goal
of rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the
protection of society.” Id.  In this case, a sufficient consideration of the mitigating factors
demonstrates the district court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason, as
6continuing Mr. Schmid’s probation would be more consistent with rehabilitation and
protection of society.
As Mr. Schmid’s experiences in the rider program demonstrate, he is able to be
productive when his mental health issues are properly addressed.  (See, e.g., PSI,
pp.6-7, 18.)  While his struggles during that program had been related to the symptoms
of his schizoaffective disorder, Mr. Schmid also has a diagnosis of a panic disorder with
agoraphobia.  (PSI, p.95.)  Accordingly, that condition also needs to be taken into
account in making sentencing decisions in this case. See I.C. § 19-2523;
Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).
To that point, the fact that Mr. Schmid was able to recognize the symptoms of his
anxiety issue were emerging in the Wood Court program actually represents a
significant step toward rehabilitation because, early on in this case, he struggled in
recognizing those issues.  (See, e.g., PSI, p.102 (2014 competency evaluation stating
Mr. Schmid was “quite adamant that he does not have a mental illness”); PSI, p.89
(progress note from April 2015 stating “Mr. Schmid has minimal insight into his mental
illness”).)  Accordingly, the fact that he had become attuned to how his conditions was
affecting him and that he sought assistance in addressing the trigger for those
symptoms indicates that probation, if appropriately tailored to his case, would promote
continued rehabilitation.3
3 The fact that the trigger for those symptoms was actually a specialty court program
does not necessarily indicate Mr. Schmid could not be successful in some other
rehabilitative program.  As defense counsel pointed out, the mental health court
program likely would have been better suited to address Mr. Schmid’s issues.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.7, Ls.17-20; see also Tr., Vol.1, p.9, L.23 - p.10, L.3 (the district court
initially ordering Mr. Schmid to return to the mental health court program after the period
7Furthermore, Mr. Schmid was making progress in other areas.  For example, he
was continuing to rebuild his relationship with his children.  (Tr., Vol.2, p.10, Ls.18-22;
see also PSI, p.88 (a state hospital clinician noting the positive impact that had, and
would continue to have, on Mr. Schmid).)  He was also working to secure employment
and housing, such that he would be able to engage in alternative treatment options.
(Tr., Vol.2, p.7, L.23 - p.9, L.9.)  Thus, especially since Mr. Schmid had not been on
probation for a significant period of time, the district court should have continued
probation with an alternative treatment plan, so as to allow Mr. Schmid to continue his
rehabilitative efforts.  That is a particularly worthwhile alternative since the last time
Mr. Schmid had begun making strides toward rehabilitation, but he was subsequently
sent to prison, those efforts were undermined, just as the state hospital clinician had
warned.  Therefore, continuing Mr. Schmid on probation, while taking into account all
his mental health issues, would better serve the goals of sentencing.  As a result, the
decision to revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence constitutes an abuse
of the district court’s discretion.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Schmid respectfully requests that this Court vacate the order revoking
probation and remand this case for an order returning him to probation.
DATED this 10th day of February, 2017.
___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
of retained jurisdiction because it felt Mr. Schmid would benefit from working with the
ACT team in that program).)
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